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Roberts and Stone: Recent Developments In Montana Natural Resources Law

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN MONTANA NATURAL
RESOURCES LAW
Stephen D. Roberts* and Albert W. Stone**
I.

INTRODUCTION

Article IX of the 1972 Montana Constitution' embodies broad
policy goals and idealistic pronouncements mirroring the convention delegates' and state citizens' concern with preserving Montana's rare natural beauty. Article IX contains four sections:2 the
first deals with protecting and improving the environment; the second, with reclaiming land disturbed by mining; the third, with recording water rights and the use of water; and the fourth, with
preserving and enhancing cultural resources.
Each section of Article IX gives the legislature not only the
power, but also the duty,3 to enforce the goals enumerated therein.
The Montana legislature has been prompt and prolific in the fulfillment of its duties under Article IX, enacting an array of environmentally related bills since 1972. In this article the authors shall
discuss the major pieces of environmental and natural resource legislation passed in Montana subsequent to 1972, and certain significant state and federal natural resources cases. The article will examine all areas of recent Montana natural resources law, with the
exception of oil and gas law.
Rather than attempting an in-depth analysis of all facets of
natural resources, the authors shall provide only a sampling of those
developments which they consider particularly noteworthy, in the
hope that the sources listed in this article will be a useful research
tool for persons interested in a particular natural resources topic,
and an overview of the law for persons with a more general interest.
II.

A.

LEGISLATION

Mines and Minerals

Three different reclamation acts set requirements to be met by
*
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1.

MONT. CONsT. art. IX.

2. A fifth section was added to Article 9 by the voters of the state. MONT. CONST. art.
IX, § 5, calls for one-fourth of the severance tax on coal to be dedicated to a trust fund.
3. Each section states that the "legislature shall provide" for enforcement of the section's provisions.
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those who mine in Montana. Each of the reclamation acts is administered by the Department of State Lands (hereinafter referred to
as the "Department") and the Board of Land Commissioners (hereinafter referred to as the "Board"). The first act, the Hard Rock
Reclamation Act,4 enacted before the effective date of the 1972
Montana Constitution, mandates reclamation of all mined lands in
Montana. An act entitled the Open Cut Mining Act originally was
enacted prior to 1972,1 but the 1973 legislature repealed that Act and
passed another with the same title. The 1973 legislature also enacted the Montana Strip and Underground Mine Reclamation Act,'
the third of the State's three major reclamation laws. The mineral
being mined determines which of the three reclamation acts controls.
1. Hard Rock Reclamation Act
If a person mines "any ore, rock, or substance, other than oil,
gas, bentonite, clay, coal, sand, gravel, phosphate rock, or uranium" 8 from the surface or below the surface of land in Montana,
he must comply with the Hard Rock Reclamation Act. No person
may disturb the surface of land, even to evaluate the economic
feasibility of hard rock mining, without first obtaining an exploration license from the Board.9 To obtain an exploration license the
miner must promise to reclaim any land disturbed during
exploration,' 0 and he must file a reclamation bond to insure the
fulfillment of that promise." The Board exercises supervisory control during the preparation of the area for the mining,'" during the
mining itself, and during the reclamation of the land after the mining.
The heart of the Hard Rock Reclamation Act is the requirement
that "no person shall engage in mining in the state without first
obtaining an operating permit to do so.'

3

To receive an operating

permit under the Act, a miner must submit to the Board an application along with a proposed reclamation plan and a reclamation and
4.
to 1226
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

REVISED CODES OF MONTANA (1947) [hereinafter cited as R.C.M. 1947],
(Supp. 1975).
R.C.M. 1947, §§ 50-1018 to 1033 (Supp. 1975).
R.C.M. 1947, §§ 50-1501 to 1517 (Supp. 1975).
R.C.M. 1947, §§ 50-1601 to 1617 (Supp. 1975).
R.C.M. 1947, § 50-1203(7) (Supp. 1975).
R.C.M. 1947, § 50-1207(1) (Supp. 1975).
R.C.M. 1947, § 50-1207(2)(ii) (Supp. 1975).
R.C.M. 1947, § 50-1207(c) (Supp. 1975).
R.C.M. 1947, § 50-1207(3), (4) (Supp. 1975).
R.C.M. 1947, § 50-1208(1) (Supp. 1975).
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revegetation bond.'4 The Department sets the amount of the bond;
but in no case may the bond "be less than the estimated cost to the
state to complete the reclamation of the disturbed land."' 5
The Board may approve the operator's reclamation plan only
if the plan will accomplish the environmental objectives listed in the
Act.'" All reclamation activities must be finished within two years
after completion of mining activities, unless the Board issues an
order extending this time period." Once the operation begins the
operator must submit annual reports listing both the additional
area he estimates will be disturbed by the operation within the
following permit year and the activities completed during the preceding year. To insure that the operator complies with the requirements of the Act, the Board may order inspection of the permit
area.'9 The attorney general must, upon the request of the Department, sue any violator of the Act for recovery of civil penalties of
up to $1,000 for each day of violation, and for temporary or permanent injunctive relief. 0
Several deficiencies in the Hard Rock Reclamation Act hamper
effective reclamation of mined land. R.C.M. 1947, § 50-1220, exempts from the requirements of the Act, those persons who mine
five acres or less of surface area. If the "small miner" merely agrees
to refrain from polluting or contaminating any stream," no other
section of the Act regulates the condition in which he leaves the land
after he ceases to mine. Montana has no provision, therefore, for the
reclamation of hard rock mined land where the area mined is five
acres or less. The Montana Constitution requires, however, that
14. R.C.M. 1947, § 50-1208(1)(c), (h) (Supp. 1975). The operating permit application
must also contain the name and address of the miner, the minerals expected to be mined,
the expected starting date of mining, a map showing the specific area to be mined, the types
of access roads to be built and the manner in which they will be reclaimed, and a plan of
mining.
15. R.C.M. 1947, § 50-1211 (Supp. 1975).
16. R.C.M. 1947, § 50-1203(ii) (Supp. 1975) requires the applicant for an operating
permit to include in his reclamation plan a statement of the proposed use of the land after
reclamation, plans for surface gradient restoration, type of revegetation of the surface, procedures proposed to avoid danger to human life or property, method of disposal of'mining
debris, method of diverting surface waters around the disturbed areas where necessary to
prevent water pollution or soil erosion, method of reclamation of stream channels and banks,
maps and documents required by the department, and a time schedule for reclamation.
R.C.M. 1947, § 50-1209 (Supp. 1975), lists several additional requirements that the reclamation plan must satisfy.
17. R.C.M. 1947, § 50-1209(a) (Supp. 1975).
18. R.C.M. 1947, § 50-1212 (Supp. 1975). If operations are completed or abandoned
prior to the anniversary date of the permit, the operator's report of activities must be submitted within 30 days after such abandonment or completion.
19. R.C.M. 1947, § 50-1213 (Supp. 1975).
20. R.C.M. 1947, § 50-1222 (Supp. 1975).
21. R.C.M. 1947, § 50-1220(i) (Supp. 1975).
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"[aill lands disturbed by the taking of natural resources shall be
reclaimed." 22 [emphasis added]. Thus, although the Act was
passed to benefit the "small miner", even the largest and wealthiest
corporation need not reclaim the land it mines, if it agrees not to
mine more than five acres2 3 or remove more than 100 tons of material
per day.24
A further weakness of the Hard Rock Reclamation Act lies in
its provision that all information contained in applications for exploration licenses and all information given by small miners shall
be confidential between the Board and the applicant. 5 Under this
section, if facts on the application led the Board to believe that a
miner was polluting the air or water, the Board could report the
alleged violation to the Department of Health and Environmental
Sciences only by violating the secrecy section and subjecting itself
to the possibility of a $1,000 fine.
Yet another provision of the Act which is impractical in certain
instances is the requirement that the applicant's operating permit
be automatically approved if the Board does not approve or deny
the application within sixty days of its filing.26 Other state statutes
require that if the proposed project will significantly affect the quality of the human environment, the Board must issue an environmental impact statement (EIS). 7 The time required to assess an
application to determine whether an EIS is necessary, to compile a
comprehensive EIS after consulting other state agencies, and to
allow public response, will often make it difficult to meet that deadline. The legislature would do well to extend the period of time given
to the Board to consider applications for operating permits.
2.

Open Cut Mining Act

The Open Cut Mining Act,2 8 passed by the 1973 legislature,
provides for the reclamation of land subjected to the open cut mining of bentonite, clay, scoria, phosphate rock, sand, or gravel. 9 The
Act authorizes the State Board of Land Commissioners to enter into
22. MONT. CONST. art. IX, § 2(1). Is the time, expense, and paperwork involved in
requiring the approximately 900 small miners in Montana to reclaim their five acres or less,
and the Department of State Lands to oversee and enforce that reclamation, justified by the
benefits the state would receive? If so, the Act should be amended to require reclamation by
small miners. If, however, the benefits do not outweigh the costs, the Constitution should be
amended to exclude small areas of mined land from its reclamation requirements.
23. R.C.M. 1947, § 50-1220 (Supp. 1975).
24. R.C.M. 1947, § 50-1203(15) (Supp. 1975).
25. R.C.M. 1947, § 50-1221 (Supp. 1975).
26. R.C.M. 1947, § 50-1210 (Supp. 1975).
27. R.C.M. 1947, 44 69-6504(3), 69-6518(i) (Supp. 1975).
28. R.C.M. 1947, § 50-1501 to 1517 (Supp. 1975).
29. R.C.M. 1947, 44 50-1504(2) to 1507 (Supp. 1975).
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contracts with operators for the reclamation of open cut land.30 If an
operator's mining operations throughout the State result in the removal of 10,000 or more cubic yards of product or overburden, 3' the
operator must apply for a reclamation contract and submit a reclamation plan before conducting mining operations. 2
Before commencing to mine, the operator must post a bond of
$200 to $1,000 per acre. If the operator fails to reclaim affected land,
the Board must apply the forfeited bond toward restoration.3 3 After
breach of the contract by the operator, the Board must institute an
action to enjoin future operation and may sue for breach of contract,
for payment of the performance bond, or both.3 ' An operator required by this Act to have a contract, but who conducts operations
without a contract, is guilty of a misdemeanor for each day's violation .3
Certain areas of the Open Cut Mining Act should be amended
by the legislature. The Act's de minimis provision, R.C.M. 1947,
§ 50-1507, which exempts operators removing only 9,999 cubic
yards of overburden or less in a year, suffers the same constitutional
infirmity as the small miner exemption in the Hard Rock Reclamation Act. Likewise, the Board should be given authority to extend,
when necessary, the sixty-day period allowed under R.C.M. 1947, §
50-1510, for it to consider and decide upon the applicant's reclamation plan. As with the Hard Rock Reclamation Act, when an EIS is
required, sixty days will likely be far too brief to allow adequate
consideration, preparation, and public and agency involvement in
the final decision. The maximum reclamation bond of $1,000 per
acre may be inadequate to insure satisfactory reclamation at today's
costs of hiring skilled labor and renting heavy equipment. If the
statute were amended so as to require a bond commensurate with
the estimated cost to the State to reclaim the disturbed land, the
purposes of the Act more likely would be effectuated.
Further legislation is necessary to remove the underground
mining of phosphate rock from the Open Cut Mining Act and to
place it under the regulation of the Hard Rock Reclamation Act.
R.C.M. 1947, § 50-1203(7) specifically excludes the mining of phosphate rock from the ambit of the Hard Rock Reclamation Act.
R.C.M. 1947, § 50-1504(2) lists phosphate rock as a mineral which
30. R.C.M. 1947, § 50-1503 (Supp. 1975).
31. R.C.M. 1947, § 50-1507 (Supp. 1975).
32. R.C.M. 1947, § 50-1508 (Supp. 1975). Before the reclamation plan may be accepted,
it must satisfy the eleven requirements listed in R.C.M. 1947, § 50-1510 (Supp. 1975).
33. R.C.M. 1947, § 50-1509 (Supp. 1975).
34. R.C.M. 1947, § 50-1510 (Supp. 1975).
35. R.C.M. 1947, § 50-1513 (Supp. 1975).
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is regulated by the Open Cut Mining Act. The mining of phosphate
rock, however, can involve extensive underground mining operations. The area around the mine mouth is the only land which is
open cut mined within the meaning of the Open Cut Mining Act.
Thus, that area around the mine mouth, and not the underground
mine itself, is the only land that must be reclaimed. Because the
Hard Rock Reclamation Act regulates underground mining, underground phosphate mining should be placed in that Act rather than
in the Open Cut Mining Act.
Another section of the Open Cut Mining Act which warrants
amendment is the requirement that all prosecutions for operation
of open cut mines without a reclamation contract be handled by the
county attorney for the county in which the mine is operated. This
may result in conflicts of interest and may thwart effective enforcement of the Act. A county attorney might be required to prosecute
a violator who is a client or friend, or indeed even an agency of the
county that pays his salary. It is not surprising that under this
system of prosecution only two fines for violation of the State's
open cut mining acts have been collected in the past five years. If
the attorney general handled prosecutions under the Open Cut Mining Act, as he does under each of the State's other two reclamation
acts, a more consistent and impartial enforcement of the law would
result.
3.

Strip and UndergroundMine Reclamation Act

The most recently enacted of Montana's three major reclamation laws is the Montana Strip and Underground Mine Reclamation
Act of 1973.3 That Act, which applies solely to the mining of coal
and uranium, was enacted during a time of widespread public concern over the potential environmental dangers of unrestricted strip
mining. 37 Under the Act, an operator may not mine coal or uranium in Montana unless he first obtains from the Department of
State Lands an operating permit designating the land affected by
36. R.C.M. 1945, §§ 50-1034 to 1037 (Supp. 1975).
37. Letters to authors from Archie Cochrane (Nov. 21, 1976), Perry J. Moore (Nov. 29,
1976), and Gordon Bollinger (Dec. 8, 1976) (letters on file with MONTANA LAw REVIEW). These
three co-sponsors of the Montana Strip and Underground Reclamation Act, each stated to
the authors that public awareness and concern over the dangers of unrestricted strip mine
coal development was a major reason that the Act was passed. Each of the legislators indicated that the separate reclamation act for coal and uranium was passed in the belief that
the laws regulating reclamation of lands subjected to hard rock mining were insufficient to
remedy the entirely different mining and environmental problems which strip mining posed.
38. An "operator" is defined in R.C.M. 1947, § 50-1036(7) (Supp. 1975) as "a person
engaged in strip mining or underground mining who removes or intends to remove more than
ten thousand (10,000) cubic yards of mineral or overburden."
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the operator's strip or underground mining operation. The operator,
in his permit application, must submit a plan for the mining and
subsequent reclamation of the land and water affected by his mining operation. For each acre of land to be disturbed by the mining
operation, the operator must furnish a bond of $200 to $2,500. The
exact amount of the bond is determined by the Department, but in
no event may the bond be less than the total estimated cost of
reclamation."' Furthermore, before the operator may enter upon
land and commence strip mining operations, he must obtain the
written consent of, or waiver by, the surface owner.'
The Department has the discretion to approve or disapprove an
operator's application. The Act prohibits approval of any application for land having "special, exceptional, critical or unique characteristics . . ." or for land which, if mined, will adversely affect
nearby land with such special characteristics." Nor may the Department approve an application if it is inevitable that mining will
result in water pollution, landslides, etc., or if the operation will
constitute a hazard to houses or other occupied structures or public
2
lands.'
An operator is charged with the duty of revegetating the mined
land 3 and restoring it to its original contour." The operator must
reclaim "[als rapidly, completely, and effectively as the most modern technology . . . will allow.' 5 Noncompliance with the Act may
result in the Department's revocation of the operator's permit and
forfeiture of his bond." The bond may be used to defray the State's
cost in reclaiming affected land.41 Violations may also subject an
operator to civil fines and criminal penalties.4 As with the Hard
Rock Reclamation Act discussed above, the Act provides for suit by
the attorney general to collect these fines and penalties. 49 But, un39. R.C.M. 1947, § 50-1039 (Supp. 1975).
40. R.C.M. 1947, § 50-1039.1 (Supp. 1975). An exception is made when the federal
government owns the mineral estate. For an extended discussion of R.C.M. 1947, § 50-1039.1
and an analysis of the statute's possible constitutional infirmities, see Comment, Montana's
Statutory Protection of Surface Owners from Strip Mining and Resultant Problems of Mineral Deed Construction, 37 MONT. L. REv. 347 (1976).
41. Such "special" land is defined in R.C.M. 1947, § 50-1042 (Supp. 1975), as land
which possesses special biological productivity, ecological fragility, ecological importance,
.scenic, historic, . . . geological ... or recreational significance."
42. R.C.M. 1947, § 50-1042 (Supp. 1975).
43. R.C.M. 1947, § 50-1045 (Supp. 1975).
44. R.C.M. 1947, § 50-1044 (Supp. 1975).
45. R.C.M. 1947, § 50-1043 (Supp. 1975). The remainder of § 50-1043 sets forth specific
reclamation requirements.
46. R.C.M. 1947, § 50-1050 (Supp. 1975).
47. R.C.M. 1947, § 50-1054 (Supp. 1975).
48. R.C.M. 1947, § 50-1056 (Supp. 1975).
49. Id.
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like that Act, the Strip and Underground Mine Reclamation Act
expressly permits citizens to bring a mandamus action to compel
the Department to enforce the Act.50
After the Strip and Underground Mine Reclamation Act was
enacted, certain legal writers predicted that the strictness of the Act
would encourage coal producers to look to States other than Montana for their sources of coal. 5 As stated by one author: "Montana
has boasted of having the toughest strip mine law in the nation. I
think this is correct . . . it is possible to mine coal in Montana, but
to do so will require considerable effort and preparation on the part
of any operator to comply with its rigorous law." 5 Although no one
can say how much coal would have been mined in Montana from
1973 to 1976 had there been no coal reclamation law, it is doubtful
that the Strip and Underground Mine Reclamation Act had an
overly prohibitive effect on coal mining in Montana, because coal
production in the state has increased consistently and markedly
since the Act became law.53
50. R.C.M. 1947, § 50-1055 (Supp. 1975).
51. Hall, Montana Coal: The Alamo of Interstate Commerce, 51 N. DAK. L. REV. 439
(1974); Gwynn, Mined Land Reclamation in Montana, 7 NAT. RES. LAWYER 27 (1974).
52. Gwynn, supra note 51 at 27, 29.
53. Factors other than the existence of the Act also had a bearing on how much coal
was mined in Montana from 1973 to the present date. Until 1975, R.C.M. 1947, § 84-1302
provided that coal was taxed at a rate of $.05/ton for every ton of coal in excess of 50,000 tons
that was extracted from state lands. In 1975, R.C.M. 1947, § 84-1302 was repealed and
replaced by the present coal severence tax, R.C.M. 1947, § 84-1314, which provides that strip
mined coal may be taxed at a rate of as high as $.40/ton or 30% of the coal's value.
Long term contracts entered into by the major coal producers prior to passage of the Strip
and Underground Mine Reclamation Act undoubtedly had a steadying effect on Montana
coal production; yet it is interesting to note that Westmoreland Resources did not commence
mining operations in Montana until 1974, and that, of the state's five major coal producers,
all except Knife River Coal Co., have plans for projected expansions of coal strip mining.
While the effect of the above factors and the Act itself on coal production in Montana
can only be subjectively estimated, the following objective facts on Montana coal production
show a rapid and steady increase in coal production under the Act:
MONTANA COAL PRODUCTION IN TONS, 1970-1975
Company

1970

1971

1972

1973

1974

1975

1. Western Energy
Company
2. Peabody Coal
Company
3. Decker Coal
Company
4. Knife River
Coal Company
5. Westmoreland
Resources
6. Others

1,657,737

5,161,390

5,500,775

4,253,781

3,211,770

6,407,295

1,431,956

1,495,222

1,601,179

1.971.643

2,210,647

2,104,931

74,856

0

792,949

4,159,287

6,874,365

9,283,351

321,908

325,475

320,975

312.785

329,590

300,053

0

0

0

0

1,457,673

4,048,082

25,321

89,439

27,769

23,917

40,010

18,368

State Total:

3,511,778

7,071,526

8,243,647

10,721,413

14,124,055

22,162,098

Source: Montana Department of Revenue
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4.

Other Mining Legislation

Besides complying with the Strip and Underground Mine Reclamation Act, a coal miner must also satisfy the requirements of
two other recent Montana Acts. Under the terms of the Strip and
Underground Mine Siting Act, 4 before an operator may begin preparatory work on any new strip or underground mine site location,
he must submit a reclamation plan and apply to the Department
of State Lands for a mine site location permit.5 5 Under that Act the
Department must notify the operator if the proposed site is acceptable for development of a new strip or underground mine, and if the
proposed reclamation plan is adequate. If either the site or the reclamation plan is unacceptable, the Department must notify the operator of the reasons for its unacceptability.
An operator must also file a bond of $200 to $1,000 per acre to
insure that the land will be reclaimed according to the terms of the
reclamation plan.5" This bond precedes and is in addition to the
bond required under the Strip and Underground Mine Reclamation
Act. Violators of the Act are subject to fine,57 and citizens may bring
an action of mandamus to force the government to enforce this Act.58
A coal mine operator must also comply with the Strip Mined
Coal Conservation Act.5 Under this 1973 Act, the operator must file
a strip mining plan with the Department of State Lands. The Department shall approve the plan only if it determines that the applicant's proposed strip mining operations will not waste strippable
and marketable coal. 0 Any person who engages in strip mining of
more than 10,000 cubic yards of coal or overburden without an approved strip mining plan is liable for substantial civil penalties.6
B.

Facility Siting

The legislature again relied on Article IX in passing the MonThrough the first nine months of 1976, 18,915,625 tons of coal were mined in Montana,
a pro rata increase of 13 1/2%over 1975 production.
The impact of the Act on coal development as weighed against the Act's social and
environmental benefits, are, of course, proper policy considerations for the legislature. A
comprehensive discussion of the potential impacts of coal development in eastern Montana
is presented in Montana Energy Advisory Council, Coal Development Information Packet
(Supplement I, 1975), and the references cited therein.
54. R.C.M. 1947, §§ 50-1601 to 1617 (Supp. 1975).
55. R.C.M. 1947, § 50-1607 (Supp. 1975).
56. R.C.M. 1947, § 50-1606 (Supp. 1975).
57. R.C.M. 1947, § 50-1611 (Supp. 1975).
58. R.C.M. 1947, § 50-1612 (Supp. 1975).
59. R.C.M. 1947, §§ 50-1401 to 1409 (Supp. 1975).
60. R.C.M. 1947, § 50-1405 (Supp. 1975).
61. R.C.M. 1947, § 50-1407 (Supp. 1975). A violator may be fined up to $1,000 for each
day that he operates without an approved strip mining plan.

Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 1977

9

Montana
Law Review,
Vol. REVIEW
38 [1977], Iss. 1, Art. 5
MONTANA
LAW

[Vol. 38

tana Major Facility Siting Act."2 The Act provides that no one may
construct a facility "without first obtaining a certificate of environmental compatibility and public need" from the Board of Natural
Resources and Conservation. 3
An applicant for a certificate must file an application with the
Board, 4 serve this application on government officers and
environmental agencies, and publish notice of the proposed project
in local newspapers. 5 The Department of Natural Resources and
Conservation must then evaluate the application and consider input
and analyses from other state agencies. 6 Upon receipt of the Department's report, the Board of Natural Resources and Conservation sets a date for hearing,67 at which time the applicant must show
by clear and convincing evidence that the application should be
granted ."
The Board has no authority to grant the certificate unless exacting standards are met. The Board must find: "(a) the basis of
the need for the facility; (b) the nature of the probable environmental impact; (c) that the facility represents the minimum adverse
environmental impact; . . .(g) that the facility will serve the public
interest, convenience and necessity; (h) that duly authorized state
air and water quality agencies have certified that the proposed facility will not violate state and federally established standards and
implementation plans."" The Board may waive compliance with
the application requirements only if the applicant can show that
there is an immediate, urgent need for the facility. 0 It must issue
its decision in opinion form, 7 ' and that opinion is judicially reviewable.72 The remainder of the Act deals with long-range plans for construction and operation of facilities, periodic site review by the
62. R.C.M. 1947, §§ 70-801 to 829 (Supp. 1975).
63. R.C.M. 1947, § 70-804 (Supp. 1975).
64. R.C.M. 1947, § 70-806 (Supp. 1975), provides that the application must contain:
"(i) a description of the location and of the facility to be built; (ii) a summary of any studies
which have been made of the environmental impact of the facility; (iii) a statement explaining the need for the facility; (iv) a description of any alternative location or locations for the
proposed facility and an explanation of why the proposed location is best suited for the
facility; (v) other information that the applicant or the board deems necessary."
65. R.C.M. 1947, § 70-806 (Supp. 1975).
66. R.C.M. 1947, § 70-807 (Supp. 1975), provides that the Departments of Health and
Environmental Sciences, Highways, Fish and Game, and Public Service Regulation shall
report to the Department of Natural Resources and Conservation information relating to the
impact of the proposed site on each department's area of expertise.
67. R.C.M. 1947, § 70-807 (Supp. 1975).
68. R.C.M. 1947, § 70-809 (Supp. 1975).
69. R.C.M. 1947, § 70-810 (Supp. 1975).
70. R.C.M. 1947, § 70-811(4)(a), (b) (Supp. 1975).
71. R.C.M. 1947, § 70-811 (Supp. 1975).
72. R.C.M. 1947, § 70-812 (Supp. 1975).
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Board, penalties for violation of the Act, and a moratorium on the
siting of certain energy conversion facilities."
C.

Water Law

The Montana Water Use Act" was passed pursuant to Article
IX, section 3 (4), which commands the legislature to "provide for
the administration, control, and regulation of water rights and...
establish a system of centralized records, in addition to the present
system of local records."
A prior article in this publication had urged the legislature to
revitalize the State's water law.75 The present Montana Water Use
Act represents a legislative attempt to clarify the State's muddy
water law. The Act requires the Department of Natural Resources
to establish a centralized record system for all existing rights,7" and
to select specific areas or sources of water for the commencement of
7
proceedings to determine existing rights.
Although the initial investigation and documentation of existing water rights is a judicial proceeding which is commenced by
petition to a district court,78 the process will usually result in an
administrative determination by the Department of Natural Resources. The Department will file its findings with the district
court,79 which will issue a preliminary decree ° If there are no objections, that decree will become final."' Objections, which will almost
inevitably be filed, will lead to a time-consuming, complex, multiparty, water rights law suit."' This process will move from one water
source to another, and at the present rate of funding, will continue
through most or all of the next century.
The only means by which new water rights may be acquired is
by application to the Department; 3 and, if specified criteria are
satisfied,84 a permit must be issued. Water rights will pass with the
73. R.C.M. 1947, §§ 70-814 to 829 (Supp. 1975).
74. R.C.M. 1947, §§ 89-865 to 89-8-102.1 (Supp. 1975).
75. Stone, Montana Water Rights-A New Opportunity, 34 MONT. L. REV. 57 (1973).
76. R.C.M. 1947, § 89-870(1) (Supp. 1975).
77. R.C.M. 1947, § 89-870(2) (Supp. 1975).
78. R.C.M. 1947, § 89-873(1) (Supp. 1975).
79. R.C.M. 1947, § 89-874 (Supp. 1975).
80. R.C.M. 1947, § 89-875 (Supp. 1975).
81. R.C.M. 1947, § 89-877(1) (Supp. 1975).
82. A request for a hearing made by the Department or by any interested person "for
good cause shown," will trigger the hearing provisions of R.C.M. 1947, § 89-876 (Supp. 1975).
After the hearing on the preliminary decree, the district court must enter a final decree fully
defining the nature and extent of the water rights. R.C.M. 1947, § 89-877 (Supp. 1975). A
person may appeal the final decree if he satisfies the requirements of R.C.M. 1947, § 89-878
(Supp. 1975).
83. R.C.M. 1947, § 89-880 (Supp. 1975).
84. R.C.M. 1947, § 89-885 (Supp. 1975):
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land unless specifically excluded,15 but water rights may be
abandoned." The district courts shall supervise the distribution of
water among all appropriators and shall have jurisdiction to adjudi7
cate water distribution controversies.
The prospect of heavy demand by energy conversion facilities
for water in Yellowstone River basin has stimulated restrictive legislation. A 1975 amendment to the Water Use Act requires an applicant for an appropriation of 15 cubic feet per second or more to
prove by "clear and convincing evidence that the rights of a prior
appropriator will not be adversely affected." 8 A second 1975 amendment prohibits changing an appropriation of 15 cubic feet per second or more from agricultural to industrial use. 8 A 1974 addition
places a three year moratorium within the Yellowstone River basin
on the granting of any application for a reservoir with a capacity of
14,000 acre feet or more, or for a flow of 20 cubic feet per second or
more." That addition also encourages the reservation of water for
public purposes and changes of use to agriculture, irrigation, domestic and municipal."
D.

Miscellaneous Legislation

Several other acts passed since 1972 deal in whole or in part
with natural resources in Montana and deserve mention, if not extended discussion. 2 The Nongame and Endangered Species
Conservation Act 3 was passed to protect endangered species or subspecies of wildlife indigenous to Montana. The legislature, heeding
its duty under Article IX to protect the environment of the State,
The department shall issue a permit if: (1) there are unappropriated waters in the
source of supply; (2) the rights of a prior appropriator will not be adversely affected;
(3) the proposed means of diversion or construction are adequate; (4) the proposed
use of water is a beneficial use; (5) the proposed use will not interfere unreasonably
with other planned uses . . .(6) an applicant for an appropriation of 15 cubic feet
per second or more proves . . .that the right of a prior appropriator will not be
adversely affected.
85. R.C.M. 1947, § 89-893 (Supp. 1975).
86. R.C.M. 1947, § 89-894 (Supp. 1975).
87. R.C.M. 1947, § 89-896 (Supp. 1975).
88. R.C.M. 1947, § 89-885 (Supp. 1975).
89. R.C.M. 1947, § 89-892 (Supp. 1975).
90. R.C.M. 1947, § 89-8-105 (Supp. 1975).
91. R.C.M. 1947, § 89-8-110 (Supp. 1975).
92. Among those legislative enactments that should be noted are: the Energy Conservation and Alternative Energy Sources-Incentive Programs, R.C.M. 1947, §§ 84-7401 to 7413;
the Montana Economic Land Development Act, R.C.M. 1947, §§ 84-7501 to 7526; an act for
the "Lease of Geothermal Resources," R.C.M. 1947, §§ 81-2601 to 2613; and the substantial
amendments and revisions to the Sanitation in Subdivisions Act, R.C.M. 1947, §§ 69-5001
to 5009.
93. R.C.M. 1947, §§ 26-1801 to 1809 (Supp. 1975).
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also passed an act to place a moratorium on the use of uranium
solution extraction9 4 due to the unknown dangers involved in that
method of mining.
The legislature passed the State Antiquities Act 5 in fulfillment
of its duty under Article IX, section 4, "to provide a method of
identification, acquisition, restoration, enhancement, preservation,
conservation, and administration of the historic, archaeological,
paleontological, scientific, and cultural sites and objects of Montana.""6 The Montana Natural Areas Act of 197411 establishes a
system for the perpetual protection of natural areas. The legislature
also adopted the Natural Stream Bed and Land Preservation Act
of 197598 to protect the State's natural rivers and streams from unnecessary soil erosion or sedimentation, while insuring the waters'
use for any beneficial purpose guaranteed by the Montana Constitution.
E. Agency Turnover
Agency staff turnover hampers effective enforcement of these
many new reclamation and conservation laws. Because reclamation
is an ongoing process that may take several years from initial operating permit application to final restoration of the mined land, retention of experienced staff personnel is essential to a workable
reclamation program. The low salaries offered by the state government to field inspectors99 are not competitive with salaries offered
by the federal government, private consulting firms, and industry.
This has resulted in a high turnover rate for staff in the Department
of State Lands."" Inspectors who reviewed coal permits in 1973 are
no longer employed by the Department, and thus are not available
to study the reclamation of the mined areas in 1976. Montana
should follow the lead of other states' 0' and attempt to reduce staff
turnover by increasing the salaries of state employees.
94. R.C.M. 1947, §§ 50-1701 to 1704 (Supp. 1975).
95. R.C.M. 1947, §§ 81-2501 to 2514 (Supp. 1975).
96. R.C.M. 1947, § 81-2502 (Supp. 1975).
97. R.C.M. 1947, §§ 81-2701 to 2713 (Supp. 1975).
98. R.C.M. 1947, §§ 26-1510 to 1523 (Supp. 1975).
99. The starting salary in the Department of State Lands for an "Inspector I" position
is $9,900.
100. Interview with C. C. McCall, Administrator for the Department of State Lands
Reclamation Division, (Nov. 21, 1976). Mr. McCall stated that since June, 1973, the division
has lost fourteen staff members. The staff numbered six in 1973 and eighteen at present.
101. "The 1976 West Virginia Legislature recognized the Division of Reclamation's
problem and . . .[bleginning July 1, all inspectors and supervisors within the Division must
receive a minimum salary of $15,000 per year . . . .The Division, like other state agencies
had experienced significant turnover . . . . The Division is hopeful that this action will
provide a precedent for other states which are experiencing similar turnover problems." The
National Assoc. of State Land Reclamationists Newsletter, June 20, 1976, at 1, col. 2.
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LAND USE LAW

In 1973, the Montana legislature enacted the Montana Subdivision and Platting Act'02 which totally revised and replaced the prior
Montana plat law. 0 3 Considered the "most dramatic result of the
1973 Legislative Assembly insofar as land use legislation is concerned," 4 the Act applies, with certain narrow exceptions, to all
land divided into parcels of less than 20 acres.0 5 Under the Act, local
governments are required to develop subdivision regulations within
0°
guidelines set down by the Department of Community Affairs. If
the local community failed to adopt such regulations by July 1,
1974, the Department was required to promulgate reasonable regulations to be enforced by the local governing body. 0 7
It is the duty of the subdivider, under the Act, to include an
environmental assessment with the preliminary plat.' The subdivider also must provide the local community with parkland, or money
in lieu of parkland. 0° Once the subdivider has submitted his plat
to the local governing body, it must determine if the plat conforms
to the local master plan and if approval of the plat would be in the
public interest." This determination is made after a public hearing
on the matter and the final decision must contain written findings."' Only after the aforementioned statutory requirements have
been satisfied, including a survey of the land, and local approval has
a final subdivision
been gained, may the subdivider file and record
2
plat and offer the land for sale or transfer."
In Montana Wilderness Association v. Board of Health and
102. R.C.M. 1947, §§ 11-3859 to 3876 (Supp. 1975).
103. R.C.M. 1947, §§ 11-601 to 616, 11-3843 to 3848, 11-3851 (Supp. 1975).
104. Lundberg, Land Use Planning and the Montana Legislature: An Overview for
1973, 35 MONT. L. REV. 38, 41 (1974).
105. When originally enacted, R.C.M. 1947, § 11-3861 was limited to parcels of 10 acres
or less, but that size limitation was increased to 20 acres by the 1975 legislature. Laws of
Montana (1975), ch. 498, § 2.
106. R.C.M. 1947, § 11-3863 (Supp. 1975). § 11-3863(1) contains specific topics that
must be included in a community's guidelines to subdividers. § 11-3863(4) lists areas that
must be discussed in a subdivider's environmental impact statement.
107. R.C.M. 1947, § 11-3863 (Supp. 1975).
108. Id.
109. R.C.M. 1947, § 11-3864 (Supp. 1975). 1/9 of the land area of lots 5 acres or less in
size and 1/12 of the land area of lots in excess of 5 acres must be dedicated to park and
playground use.
110. R.C.M. 1947, § 11-3866 (Supp. 1975). To determine the "public interest" the
governing body must, under § 11-3866(4), consider: (a) the basis of the need for the subdivision; (b) expressed public opinion; (c) effects on agriculture; (d) effects on local services; (e)
effects on taxation; (f) effects on the environment; (g) effects on wildlife and wildlife habitat;
(h) effects on the public health and safety.
111. R.C.M. 1947, § 11-3866 (Supp. 1975).
112. R.C.M. 1947, § 11-3867 (Supp. 1975).
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Environmental Sciences,"I the Montana Supreme Court broadly
interpreted the language of both Article IX and the Subdivision and
Platting Act, concluding that private citizens have standing to sue
to enjoin state agencies from approving subdivisions until the agencies have met the requirements of both the Subdivision and Platting
Act and the Montana Environmental Policy Act. The court also
clarified the requirements for a satisfactory state agency environmental impact statement (EIS).
Plaintiffs and respondents in the Montana Wilderness Association case were nonprofit corporations dedicated to environmental
causes, including the promotion of wilderness areas and the conservation of wildlife, wildlife habitat and other natural resources.
Plaintiffs brought suit against the Montana Board and [the
Montana] Department of Health and Environmental Sciences,
claiming that they approved a subdivision proposed by Beaver
Creek South, Inc. even though the Department's environmental
impact statement did not fully satisfy the requirements of the Montana Environmental Policy Act (MEPA)."14
The court rejected appellants' argument that the plaintiffs
lacked standing to bring the action. The appellants argued the following theories: (a) that the associations suffered no cognizable injury; (b) that any injury suffered or threatened was indistinguishable from the injury to the public generally; and (c) that neither MEPA nor any other statute granted standing to plaintiff associations to sue state agencies." 5
The court reviewed prior Montana cases'"' and established a
three-part test to determine standing to sue the State:
1. The complaining party must clearly allege past, present or
threatened injury to a property or civil right.
2. The alleged injury must be distinguishable from the injury to
the public generally, but the injury need not be exclusive to the
complaining party.
3. The issue must represent a 'case' or 'controversy' as is within
the judicial cognizance of the state sovereignty."'
The court found that the plaintiffs had satisfied the first stand113. 33 St.Rptr. 711 (1976).
114. R.C.M. 1947, §§ 69-6503 to 6507 (Supp. 1975).
115. Montana Wilderness Assoc. v. Board of Health and Environmental Sciences, 33
St. Rptr. 711, 715 (1976).
116. State ex rel. Conrad v. Managhan, 157 Mont. 335, 338, 485 P.2d 948 (1971); Holtz
v. Babcock, 143 Mont. 341, 380, 390 P.2d 801 (1964); State ex rel. Mitchell v. District Court,
128 Mont. 325, 329, 275 P.2d 642 (1954); Chovanak v. Matthews, 120 Mont. 520, 525-27, 188
P.2d 582 (1948).
117. Montana Wilderness Assoc. v. Board of Health and Environmental Sciences, 33
St.Rptr. 711, 720 (1976).
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ing requirement-that of a threatened injury to a property or civil
right. Plaintiffs had alleged that their right to a "clean and healthful environment" guaranteed to Montana citizens in Article IX,
section 3, 1972 Montana Constitution, was threatened by the proposed subdivision. The court rejected appellants' contention that
Article IX, section 1, vested in the legislature exclusive power to
enforce the State's duty of environmental protection." 8 The plaintiffs also met the second standing requirement-that of injury distinguishable from the injury to the public generally-because of
substantial use by their members of the public lands adjacent to the
proposed subdivision." 9
Finally, the court held the suit to be a case or controvery within
judicial cognizance because the Montana Constitution and MEPA
clearly demonstrate the State's recognition of environmental rights
and duties in Montana.' 0 By finding that private citizens' groups
such as plaintiffs had standing to sue state agencies to compel enforcement of state environmental laws, the court gave substantive
meaning to the idealistic language of the Montana Constitution and
MEPA.
After the court found standing, it addressed the main issues in
the case, specifically the Department's responsibilities under
MEPA and the Subdivision and Platting Act, and the practical
meaning of a satisfactory EIS under MEPA. Beaver Creek and the
Department maintained that final subdivision approval authority
was, by virtue of the Subdivision and Platting Act, vested solely in
the local government, and that the Department could interfere with
local subdivision approval only to the extent of its particular expertise and authority under the Sanitation in Subdivisions Act. Appellants maintained that a department EIS need analyze only the environmental effects related to water supply, sewage disposal, and solid
waste disposal.' The court rejected this argument. Had the legislature intended the local review in the Subdivision and Platting Act
to replace the state agency review in MEPA, it would have been
simple to so provide.' 2 The court did not find the two acts irreconcilable, but, rather, read them together "as creating a complementary
23
scheme of environmental protection.'
The court held that MEPA obligates the Department to prepare a comprehensive EIS for a proposed subdivision such as Beaver
118. Id.
119. Id. at 721.
120. Id. R.C.M. 1947, §§ 69-5001 to 5009 (Supp. 1975).
121. Montana Wilderness Assoc. v. Board of Health and Environmental Sciences, 33
St.Rptr. 711, 721 (1976).
122. Id. at 725.
123. Id. at 726.
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Creek before it approves subdivision water supply and sewer systems.2 4 According to the court, the Department's Beaver Creek EIS
inadequately examined both the economic costs to the proposed
subdivision's locality," 5 and the visual effects of the structures to be
built.' The EIS was also deficient in its study of the effect of the
proposed subdivision on the wildlife in the area.'2 7
By interpreting MEPA and the Subdivision and Platting Act
to require complementary rather than mutually exclusive action by
local and state governments, the court insured that neither entity
could abdicate its responsibilities to the other: "The cooperative
inter- and intra-governmental approach fostered by MEPA section
69-6503, R.C.M. 1947, should encourage the free exchange of data
compiled by local and state agencies."' 2
The final question the court examined was the appropriate
remedy available to the plaintiffs. The court said: "The rule is well
settled that injunction actions by private parties against public officials must be based upon an irreparable injury and a clear showing
of illegality."'2 9 Because plaintiffs showed potential irreparable
injury (environmental damage) and illegality by the Department
(an EIS that failed to meet the minimum standards of MEPA), the
court granted injunctive relief, preventing construction of the subdivision until the agency had fully complied with MEPA.
The supreme court decided the Montana Wilderness
Association case in July, 1976, by a three to two majority. Justice
Haswell wrote the majority opinion with the concurrence of Justice
Daly and District Judge Arthur Martin, sitting for Chief Justice
James Harrison. 30 Justice John Harrison concurred in the majority
opinion's ruling on standing and EIS standards, but dissented from
the majority's opinion that injunctive relief should be granted to the
124. Id. at 727. R.C.M. 1947, § 69-6504(b)(3) (Supp. 1975), provides:
[AIII agencies of the state shall include in every recommendation or report on
proposals for projects . . . significantly affecting the quality of the human environment, a detailed statement on-(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action, (ii any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the
proposal be implemented, (iii) alternatives to the proposed action, (iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man's environment and the maintenance and
enhancement of long-term productivity, and (v) any irreversible and irretrievable
commitments of resources which would be involved in the proposed action should
it be implemented.
125. Montana Wilderness Assoc. v. Board of Health and Environmental Sciences, 33
St.Rptr. 711, 730 (1976).
126. Id. at 731.
127. Id. at 732.
128. Id. at 730.
129. Id. at 735.
130. Id. at 711.
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plaintiffs.' 3 ' Justice Castles dissented from the majority on all three
issues. ,32
The July 22 majority opinion in Montana Wilderness
Association was law in Montana for less than six months. The supreme court granted appellants' petition for rehearing and, on December 30, 1976, reversed their prior holding.'33 The second
Montana Wilderness Association case was also a three to two decision. Justice Castles wrote the majority opinion two days before his
term on the court expired. Justice John Harrison, who dissented in
part in the first Montana Wilderness Association case, concurred
with the majority opinion. Justices Haswell and Daly dissented.
Judge Arthur Martin, the district judge who sat for Chief Justice
James Harrision, changed his opinion on rehearing and, in so doing,
became the third member of the majority changing the court's prior
ruling on the case.
The majority found that the legislature demonstrated a clear
intent in the 1973 Subdivision and Platting Act that local governmental units should control subdivision development.'34 The court's
majority found no similar legislative grant of subdivision control
given in MEPA to the State or its agencies.' 35 Rather, the only duty
of the Department of Health and Environmental Sciences in the
regulation of subdivision development was, in the majority's opinion, "in the statutorily prescribed areas of water supply, sewage and
solid waste disposal (as required in the 1967 Subdivision and
Sanitation Act)."' 3 Because the local governing unit, the Gallatin
County Commission, complied with the provisions of the Subdivision and Platting Act, and because the majority decided that a
comprehensive revised EIS was not required of the Department
under MEPA, the court's majority vacated the injunction originally
ordered by the district court to halt the development of the Beaver
Creek subdivision.' 37 The issue of citizens' standing to sue state
agencies for non-compliance with MEPA, normally the threshold
determination before a court may adjudicate substantive issues,
and citizens' right to injunctive relief against state agencies not
complying with MEPA, were not decided by the majority, "because
' 38
of our view of the law of Montana.'
131.
132.
133.
St. Rptr.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

Id.at 736.
Id.at 738.
Montana Wilderness Assoc. v. Board of Health and Environmental Sciences, 33
1320 (1976).
Id.
Id.

Id.
Id.
Id.
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The majority in the second Montana Wilderness Association
decision left several questions unanswered. Justice Harrison and
Judge Martin concurred with the majority in the first Montana
Wilderness Association in holding that the provisions of MEPA require the Department of Health and Environmental Sciences to
submit a comprehensive revised EIS for a proposed subdivision such
as Beaver Creek South. Both Justice Harrison and Judge Martin,
however, concurred in Justice Castles' majority opinion in the second Montana Wilderness Association which ruled that MEPA is not
applicable to subdivision developments. Neither Justice Harrision
nor Judge Martin wrote a concurring opinion in the second decision
to indicate why he had so completely changed his position on this
important legal issue.
In the first Montana Wilderness Association decision, Justice
Haswell looked to federal case law for interpretation of the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA),3 5 the federal statute from
which MEPA is modeled. Justice Haswell cited Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Committee, Inc. v. AEC 4 ' as strong authority for its holding that MEPA required the Department of Health and Environmental Sciences to submit a comprehensive revised EIS for subdivisions that may have a major environmental impact. 4 ' The majority
in the second decision neglected to distinguish the cases cited in the
first majority opinion. The new majority based its decision solely on
a reading of selected provisions in Montana's Sanitation in Subdivisions Act, Subdivision and Platting Act, and MEPA, and failed to
cite a single case in support of its position.
Both Justice Haswell and Justice Daly dissented from the majority opinion in the second Montana Wilderness Association case.
Justice Haswell excoriated the majority for dealing "a mortal blow
to environmental protection in Montana. With one broad sweep of
the pen, the majority has reduced constitutional and statutory protections to a heap of rubble, ignited by the false issue of local control."'4 Justice Haswell proceeded to incorporate in his dissenting
opinion the original majority opinion of the court.
IV.
A.

FEDERAL CASE LAW

The Monongahela Decision

Of the innumerable federal court decisions relating to natural
139. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-47 (1973 & Supp. 1976).
140. 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C.Cir. 1971).
141. Montana Wilderness Assoc. v. Board of Health and Environmental Sciences, 33
St.Rptr. 711, 727 (1976).
142. Montana Wilderness Assoc. v. Board of Health and Environmental Sciences, 33
St. Rptr. 1320 (1976).

Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 1977

19

188

Montana
Law Review,
Vol. 38REVIEW
[1977], Iss. 1, Art. 5
MONTANA
LAW

[Vol. 38

resources decided since 1972,11 one which has received considerable
attention is the "Monongahela decision."'' The district court in the
Monongahela case held that the U.S. Forest Service had no right to
enter into contracts for the clearcutting of timber in Monongahela
National Forest. The court found that Section 476 of the Organic
Act of 1897,111 the act which created the national forest system,
"authorizes the sale only of the 'dead, matured, or large growth of
trees,' and requires that 'before being sold, shall be marked and
designated' . . . Policies and practices of the United States Forest
Service to the contrary are an unwarranted intrusion into an exclusive area of congressional province.""'
The district court, and the circuit court in its opinion affirming
the lower court's ruling, held that the Forest Service's prior practice
of authorizing clearcutting of entire tracts of timber was statutorily
impermissable. Rather, the Organic Act required the individual
inspection and marking for cutting of only those trees which were
dead, matured, or large. Young trees had to be left standing, unless
Congress chose to amend the Organic Act to allow clearcutting in
47
the national forests.1
The decision of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in
Monongahela was applied by a court of the Ninth Circuit in the case
of Zieske v. Butz. " In the Zieske case, the Alaska district court,
Judge von der Heydt, held that the Organic Act precluded clearcut143. A partial listing includes National Forest Preservation Group v. Butz, 485 F.2d 408
(9th Cir. 1973), regarding the authority of the Forest Service to exchange National Forest land
for privately owned land; Trout Unlimited v. Morton, 509 F.2d 1276 (9th Cir. 1974) regarding
requisites of an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) under the National Environmental
Policy Act (NEPA); Montana Wildlife Federation v. Morton, 406 F. Supp. 489 (D. Mont.
1975), holding that scientific unanimity is not required in an EIS under NEPA; Natural
Resources Defense Council v. Callaway, 392 F. Supp. 685 (D. D.C. 1975), holding that the
responsibilities of the Army Corps of Engineers under the Federal Water Pollution Control
Act were not limited to those waters as defined under traditional tests of navigability, but
extended to the nation's waters to the maximum extent permissable under the commerce
clause; General Agriculture Corp. v. Moore, 166 Mont. 510, 534 P.2d 859 (1975), regarding
what constitutes existing water rights under art. 9, § 3 of the 1972 Montana Constitution;
Montana Bd. of Natural Resources and Conservation v. Montana Power Co., 166 Mont. 522,
536 P.2d 758 (1975), regarding the meaning of the phrase "commence to construct" for the
purpose of the Utility Siting Act provision that a certificate of public need is not required for
facilities under construction or in operation on 1/1/73; Carroll v. Eaton, - Mont. -, 541
P.2d 64 (1975), regarding construction of terms in mining leases.
144. West Virginia Div. of the Izaak Walton League of America, Inc. v. Butz, 367 F.
Supp. 422 (N.D.W.Va. 1973), aff'd., 522 F.2d 945 (4th Cir. 1975).
145. 16 U.S.C. § 476 (1970).
146. West Virginia Div. of the Izaak Walton League of America, Inc. v. Butz, 367 F.
Supp. 422, 433 (N.D.W.Va. 1973).
147. For more extended discussions of the Monongahela case, see Note, 76 W. VA. L.
REv. 420 (1974); Note, 9 LAND AND WATER L. REV. 527 (1974); Note, 27 OKLA. L. REV. 700
(1974).
148. 406 F. Supp. 258 (D. Ala. 1975).
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ting in an Alaskan national forest. The case was not appealed to the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, and thus does not directly affect
clearcutting policies in Montana's national forests, but Montana's
national forests are, of course, under the same Organic Act.
In 1976, Congress accepted the courts' invitation to amend the
Organic Act, so as to allow clearcutting in the national forests.'4 9
B.

Cappaert v. United States

In Cappaert v. United States,50 the Supreme Court discussed
the meaning and dimensions of the "reserved water rights doctrine." The Cappaerts, petitioners in the case, sought to pump
water for use on their ranch from underground sources which, by
percolation, supplied a pool in Devil's Hole, a deep cavern that had
been reserved as part of Death Valley National Monument. The
pumping of the water by the Cappaerts significantly lowered the
water level in the Devil's Hole pool, thereby endangering the future
of the pool's denizens, a species of prehistoric fish found nowhere
else on earth. 5 '
The United States brought action to enjoin the Cappaerts from
further depleting the water sources of Devil's Hole, claiming that
the United States, in establishing the land as part of the national
monument, "reserved the unappropriated waters appurtenant to
the land, to the extent necessary for the requirements and purposes
of the reservation." 5 ' In their answer, the Cappaerts denied that the
reservation of Devil's Hole reserved any water rights for the United
States.)"
The Court held that when the United States withdraws its land
from public use and reserves it for a federal purpose, it acquires
water rights superior to all future appropriators to the extent necessary to accomplish the purpose for which the land was reserved. 5"
In this case, the purpose of the reservation of the Devil's Hole pool
was preservation of its scientific interest, and the scientific interest
consisted mainly of the unique fish which lived in the pool. The
Court therefore allowed the Cappaerts to pump ground water only
to the extent that the pool level would not decrease to a point where
the fish would be endangered and the purpose of the reservation
frustrated. 5 5
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

16 U.S.C. § 472(a) (1976).
96 S. Ct. 2062 (1976).
Id. at 2067.
Id.at 2068.
Id.
Id.at 2069.
Id.at 2071.
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The Cappaert case, in addition to being good news to Devil's
Hole pupfish and their admirers, was the first Supreme Court decision to apply the doctrine of implied reservation of water rights to
groundwater. The Court rejected the argument that the implied
reservation doctrine is limited to surface water. Rather, as a test to
determine what water rights had impliedly been reserved by the
United States, the Court reiterated its concern by focusing solely on
the purpose for which the government had reserved the land. "Thus,
since the implied reservation of water doctrine is based on the necessity of water for the purpose of the federal reservation, we hold
that the United States can protect its water from subsequent diversion, whether the diversion is of surface or groundwater."' 5 " This
decision will affect future uses of groundwater by private parties in
Montana, as it did the Cappaert ranch, because of the vast federal
reservations in Montana, such as national forests, military reservations, wildlife preserves, parks and Bureau of Land Management
land.
C.

The Akin Case

One of the issues involved in the case of Colorado River Water
Conservation District v. United States'57 (the "Akin case") was
whether the McCarren amendment, 43 U.S.C. § 666, manifested a
congressional consent to have reserved water rights held on behalf
of Indians adjudicated in state courts, and thus provided a basis
for federal courts to abstain from such adjudications in deference to
state court proceedings.
The Court noted that 28 U.S.C. § 1356 provides that the federal
district courts shall have original jurisdiction over all civil actions
brought by the federal government except as Congress should by
legislation otherwise provide.' The Court then viewed the government's trusteeship of Indian water rights as the equivalent of ownership of such rights.'59 Citing two previous Supreme Court cases 6 ° for
the proposition that the McCarren amendment, by its language,
impliedly consented to adjudication of federally owned reserved
water rights in state courts, the Court concluded that state courts
had jurisdiction of Indian water rights under the amendment. I The
Court further found in the underlying policy and legislative history
156. Id. at 2072.
157. 96 S. Ct. 1236 (1976).
158. Id. at 1241.
159. Id. at 1242.
160. United States v. District Court for Eagle County, 401 U.S. 520 (1971); and United
States v.District Court for Water Division No. 5, 401 U.S. 527 (1971).
161. Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States, 96 S. Ct. 1236, 1242
(1976).
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of the McCarren amendment, an intent by Congress to include federal water rights reserved on behalf of Indians among the rights
subject to adjudication in state courts.'6 2 This has obvious implications for the current water right adjudication actions on the Tongue,
Powder and Big Horn Rivers, and for subsequent water adjudications in other watersheds where there are Indian reservation lands.
In declaring reserved Indian water rights to be justiciable in
state courts, the Supreme Court rejected the Government's argument that state court jurisdiction could be recognized only if expressly conferred by Congress. Furthermore, the Court rather summarily dismissed the fear of many Indian tribes that their rights
would receive less adequate attention in state courts than in federal
courts:
Mere subjection of Indian rights to legal challenge in state court,
however, would no more imperil those rights than would a suit
brought by the Government in district court. . . .Indian interests
63
may be satisfactorily protected under regimes of state law.
Indian water rights were first recognized by the United States
Supreme Court in a 1908 case, Winters v. United States. 4 There,
the Court said: "The power of the government to reserve the waters
and exempt them from appropriation under the state laws is not
denied, and could not be. . . . That the government did reserve
them we have decided .
,,.11 But the context of the case was the
construction of an 1888 "agreement" or treaty, which in form was a
cession by the Indians to the United States of a large amount of
land, retaining and reserving to themselves a smaller tract known
as the Fort Belknap Reservation. This aspect of the case is more
clearly stated in an earlier case.' ". . . [T]he treaty was not a
grant of rights to the Indians, but a grant of rights from them-a
reservation of those not granted ...
"I"
Based on the Court's interpretation of this treaty language in
which the Indians ceded land to the United States, the Indians
contended that their rights to the land and water do not stem from
a reservation or grant from the United States, but rather, that those
rights are aboriginal and immemorial, as well as unquantifiable. In
68 the Court had dealt
Arizona v. California'
with non-treaty reservations for which it assigned priority dates and specific quantities of
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.

Id. at 1243.
Id. at 1243-44.
207 U.S. 564 (1908).
Id. at 577.
United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905).
Id. at 381.
373 U.S. 546 (1963).
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water. The Indians argued that cases such as Arizona v. California
must be distinguished from those such as Winters.
By implication, the Supreme Court seems to be denying, or at
least ignoring, this position of the Indians. It based its decision in
Arizona v. California upon the Winters case." 9 And in Colorado
River Water Conservancy District v. United States, 170
it based its
decision upon both Winters and Arizona v. California, without distinction or discrimination.' If this portends the result when the
Court squarely faces this issue, as it seems it must, it will be disappointing to the Indians, but will simplify and stabilize water rights
and their administration.
D. Oregon ex rel. State Land Board v. Corvallis Sand and Gravel
Co.
An Oregon case now pending before the United States Supreme
Court could affect land titles in Montana and in all other public
land states, particularly with respect to land along navigable
streams, and land that was formerly the bed of a navigable stream
which shifted to a new channel. The case, Oregon ex rel. State
Land Board v. Corvallis Sand and Gravel Co.,7' involves land titles
affected by avulsion or accretion in the Willamette River. The Oregon Supreme Court adhered to the concept that federal law, rather
than state real property laws, determines boundaries and titles to
land affected by avulsion, accretion, reliction or other phenomena,
where the source of title was originally the federal government.' 73
That concept appears to be contrary to earlier Court decisions, 74 but it follows two more recent Supreme Court cases. Hughes
v. Washington7 5 announced the doctrine with respect to coastal
land, and in 1973 it was extended inland to navigable streams in
Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona.' Both of these later cases relied on
language in Borax Ltd. v. Los Angeles'77 , stating that the extent of
a federal grant "is necessarily a federal question" but ignored the
statement in the Borax case to the effect that once the land comes
under state sovereignty, ownership questions "are matters of local
law."'7 6 The issue needs review and reconsideration, and so it is
169. Id. at 599-600.
170. 96 S. Ct. 1236 (1976).
171. Id.at 1240.
172. 18 Ore.Ct.App. 524, 526 P.2d 469 (1974), aff'd.,
536 P.2d 517 (1975), cert. granted,
96 S. Ct. 772 (1976).
173. Oregon v. Corvallis Sand and Gravel Co., 536 P.2d 517 (Ore. 1975).
174. Joy v. St. Louis, 201 U.S. 332 (1906); St. Anthony Falls Water-Power Co. v. St.
Paul Water Commrs., 168 U.S. 349 (1897); Packer v. Bird, 137 U.S. 661 (1891).
175. 389 U.S. 290 (1967).
176. 414 U.S. 313 (1973).
177. 296 U.S. 10 (1935).
178. Id. at 22.
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significant that certiorari was granted in Corvallis Sand and
Gravel."."
E.

Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Morton

The plaintiffs .in Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v.
Morton719 sought to enjoin defendant Secretary of Interior from selling or otherwise disposing of water for industrial purposes from
Yellowtail or Boysen reservoirs. The plaintiffs argued that Congress,
in the Reclamation Act of 1902,11" authorized the construction and
operation of these reservoirs, located in Montana and Wyoming, for
the exclusive purposes of providing water for agricultural irrigation,
hydroelectric power, flood and silt control, and supplementation of
stream flow. United States District Judge Battin rejected plaintiff's
argument, and held that the Secretary of Interior has authority to
market water from the reservoirs for industrial purposes, under the
Reclamation Project Act of 1939 Is' and the Flood Control Act of
1944, 182 as well as the Water Supply Act of 1958.181 Thus, the stored
waters are available to industry, under contract with the Secretary
of Interior, and, by necessary implication, the Secretary has authority to market water in all federal dams in the Missouri River Basin
for industrial use.
V.

CONCLUSION

In passing the State's network of recent natural resource laws,
the legislature thoughtfully and comprehensively responded to the
environmental concerns expressed in Article IX of the Montana
Constitution. By suggesting that provisions in recently enacted
Montana laws should be amended, we mean not to deprecate those
acts, but to suggest changes to make good laws more effective.
This brief review analyzes selected legislative and judicial actions affecting natural resources. But more significantly, it illustrates that environmental and natural resource protection has much
vitality and potential for growth through legislation and judicial
decisions.
178.1. The Court handed down its Corvallis Sand and Gravel Co. opinion on January
12, 1977, and overruled the holding in Bonnelli Cattle Co. The Court held that, where navigable rivers do not form interstate boundaries, state law, rather than federal common law is
determinative of disputel. concerning ownership of riverbed lands. Oregon ex rel. State Land
Board v. Corvallis Sand and Gravel Co., 45 U.S.L.W. 4015 (1977).
179. 420 F. Supp. 1037 (D. Mont. 1976).
180. Act of June 17, 1902, 32 Stat. 388.
181. 43 U.S.C. § 485 h(c) (1970).
182. 33 U.S.C. § 701-1 (1970).
183. 43 U.S.C. § 390 b (1970).

Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 1977

25

Montana Law Review, Vol. 38 [1977], Iss. 1, Art. 5

https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol38/iss1/5

26

